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Abstract
Previous studies have established that firms’ effectiveness can
differ based on the differences among directors within a board,
and between boards. However, studies have yet to establish the
effectiveness of the diverse attributes of the board on firms’
quality of earnings in an emerging market setting such as
Vietnam. This study investigates the effect of board diversity
on earnings quality in a sample of Vietnamese listed firms. The
two dimensions of board diversity measures in this study cover
a wide range of structural and demographic attributes of board
of directors, using a diversity-of-boards index (dissimilarities
among firm boards, i.e., board structure) and a diversity-inboards index (dissimilarities among directors within a board,
i.e., demographic attributes of board members). Earnings
quality is an aggregate measure compiled from four
accounting-based measures of earnings quality: accruals
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quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, and
earnings smoothness. We find a significant and positive
relationship between diversity-of-boards and earnings quality;
while the relationship between diversity-in-boards and earnings
quality represents a non-linear U-shaped curve.

Key words: board of directors, diversity-of-boards, diversityin-boards, earnings quality, Vietnam.

JEL classification: G3, M1, M4, J1
Summary at a glance
This study investigates the impact of board diversity and
earnings quality with a sample of Vietnamese listed firms. We
find a significant and positive relationship between diversityof-boards (dissimilarities among firm boards) and earnings
quality; while the relationship between diversity-in-boards
(dissimilarities among directors within a board) and earnings
quality represents a non-linear U-shaped curve.
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Introduction
The board of directors forms one of the cornerstones of
corporate frameworks. The organization, structure, quality and
operation of the board of directors determine many aspects of a
firm. Several scholars have examined the implications of board
diversity in relation to organizational outcomes, although the
meaning of board diversity has not been explicitly defined
(Harrison and Klein 2007). Most of the literature examines the
individual attributes of the demographic diversity among
directors within a board (such as gender diversity, age
diversity, nationality diversity) and/or the structural attributes
of board of directors, such as the chairperson also being the
Chief Executive Officer (CEO), board independence, director
ownership in relation to organizational outcomes, rather than
their combined attributes. A few studies have attempted to
combine the demographic or structural dimensions of board of
directors into a single examination to formulate a complete
picture of demographic as well as structural diversity (see BenAmar et al. 2013; Hafsi and Turgut 2013).
This paper employs two dimensions of board diversity
(Hafsi and Turgut 2013) to investigate the impact of board
diversity on the earnings quality of Vietnamese listed firms.
The two dimensions of board diversity are measured by a
diversity-of-boards index (dissimilarities among firm boards, a
dimension which relates to board structure) and a diversity-in-
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boards index (dissimilarities among directors within a board,
which relates to demographic attributes of board members).
However, we extend Hafsi and Turgut’s (2013) indices in two
ways. First, we use a refined measure of variables about
diversity-in-boards and

diversity-of-boards applicable to

Vietnam, an emerging market. Prior researchers have
concluded that governance structures are likely to develop
endogenously, depending on specific characteristics of the firm
and the unique business environment in a particular country
(Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2006; Haniffa and Hudaib 2006).
Second, unlike Hafsi and Turgut (2013), who combined
several attributes into a single index with equal weights to
construct diversity-of-boards and diversity-in-boards indices,
which may produce unexpected drawbacks (Ben-Amar et al.
2013), we apply both weighted and unweighted methods to
measure diversity-in-boards and diversity-of-boards indices. A
survey questionnaire provides executives’ perceptions about
various attributes relating to board diversity to determine their
importance. A comparison of our results between weighted and
unweighted methods allows us to investigate the potential
impact of the perceived importance of attributes relating to the
diversity-in-boards and diversity-of-boards and their impact on
earnings quality.

Theoretical framework and hypothesis
development
4

Theoretical framework
Board diversity is presented as both fiduciary and advisory in
nature (Ben-Amar et al. 2013; Labelle et al. 2010). Both roles
may affect the quality of earnings in different manners. From
the fiduciary perspective, board of directors have to be less
dependent on each other and even specialists in monitoring
shareholders’ interests. This is as stipulated in the current
regulation and generally accepted governance principles.
Agency

theory

(Jensen

and

Meckling

1976)

predicts

management interests are different and even in conflict with
those of shareholders. According to the agency theory,
diversity-of-boards can be used to establish better monitoring
and control mechanisms. It is based on the assumption that
directors with their own sets of rationalities can contribute with
different styles of controlling and monitoring the management
appropriate to the firm. The diverse fiduciary perspectives
resulting from the board members can become effective in
developing a sound controlling and monitoring mechanism.
Therefore, it is argued here that the diversity-of-boards directly
contributes to increasing the earnings quality of firms.
From the advisory perspective of governance, board
effectiveness requires a diversity of knowledge, competencies,
and organizational values to guide and contribute to
organizational learning and strategic decision making. The
emphasis

here

is

on

counselling
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and

mentoring

the

management, and not on the statutory characteristics such as
the diversity of interests or the financial literacy of the
directors. The idea

that board diversity affects

firm

performance has roots in resource dependence theory (Pfeffer
and Salancik 1978). Resource dependence theorists have
specifically argued that the combining diverse stakeholder
perspectives in board decision-making, improves firms’ ability
to obtain resources critical to their functioning (Davis and Cobb
2010; Pfeffer 1973). Diversity is necessary for board members
to be able to ask knowledgeable questions to shape the
managerial decision-making process and the organizational
culture. According to Reidenbach and Robin (1991), the moral
development of a firm is determined by the firm’s culture and
in a reciprocal fashion. By questioning, criticizing, advising,
and counselling, diversity-in-board enhances the degree of
moral or ethical development of a firm (Labelle et al. 2010),
and thus is likely to improve the earnings quality of a firm.
Hypotheses development
Diversity-of-boards and earnings quality.
A large body of literature has examined the relationship
between structural attributes of board of directors relating to the
diversity-of-boards and earnings quality (Klein 2002; Park and
Shin 2004; Rahman and Ali 2006). These structural attributes
are identified to represent recommended ‘best practice’
governance. However, most of the literature focuses on specific
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attributes, rather than their combined attributes, and the
findings from those studies are inconclusive.
In this study, diversity-of-boards is an index-driven variable
based on four structural attributes of board of directors:
CEO/chair separation, non-executive directors1 owning more
than five per cent of a firm’s equity (blockholders),
representative directors’ ownership and promoters. The term
‘representative directors’ refers to a director representing the
interest of the appointing party (such as government). We
examined the role of representative directors in the board of
directors because 97 of the firms in the sample (representing
65%) had representative directors.
(i) CEO/chair separation. The Code of Corporate Governance in

Vietnam mandates the separation of the role of chairperson of
the board of directors and CEO in a listed firm. However, a
person occupying a dual role is allowed if shareholders approve
it at general meetings. The separation of the board’s CEO and
chairperson results in reduced agency problems because it
allows more independence of the board from management for
decision making (Donaldson and Davis 1991; Jackling and Johl
2009; Jensen 1993). Prior studies suggest that the separation of
chairperson from CEO is an important element in preventing
earnings management (Rahman and Ali 2006; Robert et al.
2008).
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(ii) Non-executive directors owning more than five per cent of a
firm’s equity (blockholders). Prior research suggests that non-

executive directors who also hold blocks of shares in a firm can
reduce agency costs (Agrawal and Nasser 2011, 2012). A board
seat provides the monitoring function over managers, and the
block

shareholdings

provide

ownership

interest.

This

combination can produce a greater propensity to align
managerial self-interests with shareholder self-interests. Thus, a
non-executive director who is also a blockholder can play a
more forceful governance role (Agrawal and Nasser 2012).
From an agency point of view, board members are assumed to
be more alert if they have equity involvement (Sonnenfeld
2002).
(iii) Representative directors’ ownership. Most Vietnamese

listed firms have been transformed from traditional state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) into listed status, but the ownership of these
firms is still heavily concentrated in the hands of large stateowned shareholders (Vu et al. 2011). Instead of having
government bureaucrats directly supervising the SOEs as
before, the state now formally exercises its rights as a major
shareholder by appointing representative directors to boards.
From an agency theory perspective, directors’ level of
shareholding, both of individual and representative stocks, is
seen as an incentive to reduce agency costs.
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(iv) Promoters. Following Jayati, Subrata and Kaustav (2008),

we define promoters as controlling shareholders (i.e., the
government in our study) who also serve as inside directors on
the board. In India, family-owned corporations are common
(Jayati et al. 2008); while the Vietnamese government still
retains a substantial amount of ownership in many listed firms,
especially those deemed to be large and strategically important
to the nation (Carlin and Pham 2009). In order to monitor these
listed firms, the government appoints representatives on the
board of directors. Previous studies have shown that the
protection of state-owned listed firms by the government
reduces the incentives for managers to manipulate firm-specific
information (Ding et al. 2007; Wang and Yung 2011). In
Vietnam, outside directors may serve as representative directors
for the government to carry out its duty, but this is relatively
ineffective compared to inside directors who also serve as
representative directors for government (Representative News,
2012). This is because the outside directors of many firms
know little of the firms they represent; hence they fail to fulfill
their role. Previous studies also show that it can be good to
have a number of inside directors on the board as they may be
very candid and well-informed (Baysinger and Butler 1985;
Sonnenfeld 2002). Agency theory states that a firm’s top
management becomes more powerful when the board of
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directors is composed of people who know little of the firm
(Mulili and Wong 2011).
Combining the structural characteristics of board of
directors relating to diversity between boards into a composite
measure gives a comprehensive picture of their simultaneous
influence on various organizational outcomes (Ben-Amar et al.
2013; Hafsi and Turgut 2013). Based on the propositions of the
agency theory, structural attributes of the board of directors are
designed to control agency conflict by demanding more
conservatism. Directors are then likely to know early about any
future losses. Such early information allows directors to control
managers’ opportunistic behaviour. Based on this discussion,
this states the first hypothesis as follows.
H1: Diversity-of-boards improves earnings quality.
Diversity-in-boards and earnings quality. Earlier studies have
analyzed the relationship between demographic diversity
among directors and organizational financial performance,
rather than earnings quality, and the published evidence
remains focused on developed economies (Mahadeo et al.
2012).
In this study diversity-in-boards is an index-driven variable
based on the following four attributes of directors sourced from
the literature: gender, age, education degree and nationality.
These are among several other demographic attributes
examined in the literature, and are often mentioned in isolation
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but rarely together (Erhardt et al. 2003; Kang et al. 2007; Post
et al. 2011).
(i) Director gender.

examined

prior

The main board diversity characteristic in the
studies

is

gender

diversity.

Recently,

researchers have begun to examine the relationship between
gender diversity and earnings quality, and they document that
the presence of women on the boards leads to better board
dynamics and improved reported earnings quality (Adams and
Ferreira 2009; Francis et al. 2009; Srinidhi et al. 2011).
However, these findings focus on the US. Meanwhile, Ye,
Zhang and Rezaee’s (2010) study in China as well as Hili and
Affes’s (2012) study in France do not show a significant
relationship.
(ii) Director age. Directors’ age reflects their business

experience and is evidence of their maturity in company
management (Kang et al. 2007). Prior studies point out that
older members exhibit more conservative and moral judgment
(Hambrick and Mason 1984; McCabe et al. 2006). Due to the
greater conservatism of older members, it is expected that
boards with older directors will have higher reported earnings
quality. However, this tendency is changing, and there is an
active promotion of age diversity in order to encourage the
varying perspectives of different age groups, and as an integral
part of succession planning (Kang et al. 2007; Mahadeo et al.
2012).
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(iii) Director education degree. Director education degree is

viewed as an indicator of directors’ knowledge, cognitive
orientation and skill base (Hambrick and Mason 1984).
Previous research documents that a high level of education
among directors on boards results in a greater ability to adopt
new ideas, accept innovations (Guthrie et al. 1991; Wally and
Baum 1994) and offers a broader view and larger breadth of
understanding (Post et al. 2011). More diverse boards possess
more diverse knowledge bases, as well as the perspectives
necessary to develop and evaluate solutions to complex
problems (Milliken and Martins 1996; Van der Walt et al.
2006).
(iv) Director nationality. With increasing globalization, firms

tend to modify their governance structures by having more
foreigners on their boards (Carpenter 1998; Oxelheim et al.
2013). Milliken and Martins (1996) suggest that diversity in
national background may have a negative influence on process
effectiveness and performance in the beginning, but after a
while, more efficient processes and higher performance seem to
occur. Vietnam’s reform policy from 1986 incorporated trade
liberalization for direct foreign investment and provided
incentives to attract more foreign investment. Heijltjes, Olie
and Glunk (2003) suggest that if the home country is small,
there is a need to grow internationally, and thus the board
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should be international as well. Being a small and new
emerging country, Vietnam is a good case study.
Directors’ heterogeneous attributes are likely to bring in
different perspectives for discussion and making decisions of
the board. The propositions of the resource dependence theory
suggest that increased questioning, criticizing, advising, and
counselling, associated with diversity-in-board can enhance the
degree of moral or ethical development of a firm (Labelle et al.
2010). Based on the preceding discussion of the existing
literature and resource dependence theory, the second
hypothesis is stated as follows.
H2: Diversity-in-boards improves earnings quality.

Research methods
The sample
Our sample consists of all Vietnamese listed firms for which
the required data items are available, except for those in banks
and financial institutions because their financial statements are
prepared

in

accordance

with

their

special

regulatory

environment.
This study measures individual earnings quality using 5-year
rolling windows2 from 2006 to 2010 to generate the 2010
earnings quality measures of the sample, similar to Francis et
al. (2008). Accruals quality is one of four earnings quality
measures in this study. Due to estimating this measure requires
lagged and forward data, it generates the 2010 earnings
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attributes measures of the sample by using the financial
statement data items for seven years from the fiscal years 2005
to 2011.
The financial statement data items were extracted by hand
from Ho Chi Minh stock exchange (HOSE)’s website
(www.hsx.vn) and Hanoi stock exchange (HNX)’s website
(www.hnx.vn) because there were no electronic databases of
financial, statistical and market information on Vietnamese
listed firms. To include in the sample, each firm must have an
income statement, balance sheet, and cash flow statement for
all seven fiscal years. This is a perfectly balanced panel with
each firm having the same number of observations.
The raw data for calculation of board diversity indices in
this study is hand-collected from the 2010 annual reports and
firm websites. Our final sample, with all required data
available, includes 150 firms.
Earnings quality measures
The literature widely uses two types of earnings quality
measure:

accounting-based

measures

and

market-based

measures. A fundamental assumption underlying the marketbased measure is that the markets efficiently incorporate
accounting information. We choose accounting-based measures
because the Vietnamese market is new and semi-efficient (Phan
and Zhou 2014; Truong et al. 2008). Additionally, managers
are likely to manipulate accounting-based measures, while it is
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much harder to manipulate market-based measures (Prior et al.
2008).
This study constructs a standardised aggregate earnings
quality score as a proxy for earnings quality in the main
analyses3, based on four accounting measures which have been
used in prior studies (Boonlert-U-Thai et al. 2006; Francis et al.
2004). They are accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings
predictability and earnings smoothness. Prior studies have used
a standardised aggregate earnings quality/management score as
a proxy for earnings quality/management (see Gaio and Raposo
2011; Leuz et al. 2003). Additionally, factor analysis suggests
that a single standardised aggregate measure of earnings quality
which represents four earnings attribute measures in this study
is valid (more details of factor analysis is in Findings Section).
Accruals quality. Accruals quality (AQ) in this study is based
on the widely used Dechow and Dichev (2002) statistical
calculation technique, where it is measured by relating total
current accruals to cash flows from operations. AQ is the
standard deviation of residuals (εj) from the following
regression:
TCAj,t = φ0 + φ1CFOj,t-1 + φ2CFOj,t + φ3CFOj,t+1 + εj,t

(1)

Where TCAj,t = firm j’s total current accruals in year t (ΔCAj,t ΔCLj,t – ΔCashj,t + ΔSTDEBTj,t); CFOj,t = firm j’s cash flow
from operations in year t; ΔCAj,t = firm j’s change in current
assets between year t-1 and year t; ΔCLj,t = firm j’s change in
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current liabilities between year t-1 and year t; ΔCashj,t = firm
j’s change in cash between year t-1 and year t; and ΔSTDEBTj,t
= firm j’s change in debt in current liabilities between year t-1
and year t. All variables in equation (1) are deflated by firm j’s
total assets in year t-1. Larger values of AQ indicate less
earnings quality.
Earnings Persistence. Earnings persistence (PERSIS) is the
extent to which current period earnings reflect future period
earnings. We follow Francis et al. (2004) and measure PERSIS
as the negative of the slope coefficient estimate, ϕ1,j, from the
following model:
Earnj,t = ϕ0,j + ϕ1,jEarnj,t-1 + ѵj,t

(2)

Where Earnj,t = firm’s j net income before extraordinary items
in year t. All variables in equation (2) are deflated by firm j’s
total assets in year t-1. Larger values (i.e., less negative) of
PERSIS indicate less earnings quality.
Earnings predictability. Earnings predictability (PREDICT) is
the ability of earnings to predict itself (Lipe 1990). Our
measure of PREDICT is the standard deviation of the residuals
(ѵj) from equation (2), following Francis et al. (2004). Larger
values of PREDICT imply less earnings quality.
Earnings smoothness. This study adopts the measure of
earnings smoothness (SMOOTH) in Francis et al. (2004) as the
ratio of firm i’s standard deviation of net income before
extraordinary items scaled by beginning total assets, to its

16

standard deviation of cash flows from operations scaled by
beginning total assets. Larger values of SMOOTH imply less
earnings quality.
The aggregate earnings quality score. Based on the four
individual earnings quality measures (AQ, PERSIS, PREDICT,
SMOOTH), we construct a standardised aggregate earnings
quality score and use it to draw the conclusion of the impact of
board diversity on earnings quality. The larger the value of the
individual earnings quality measure, the lower the earnings
quality. Following Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003), we rank
the four individual earnings quality values in descending order,
so that a higher ranked value now represents higher earnings
quality. The standardised aggregate earnings quality score of a
firm is computed by averaging the firm rankings for the four
individual earnings quality measures.
Board diversity measures
Four board diversity indices are constructed in this study to
measure board diversity: unweighted diversity-of-boards index
(UW_DoB), unweighted diversity-in-boards index (UW_DiB),
weighted diversity-of-boards index (W_DoB) and weighted
diversity-in-boards index (W_DiB).
Unweighted diversity-of-boards index. As noted earlier, we
include four structural attributes of board of directors to
construct the diversity-of-boards indices. These are measured
as shown in Table 1.
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< Insert Table 1 about here>
In order to construct UW_DoB, we use the inter-sample
distance-measurement method (Hafsi and Turgut 2013) which
measures the structural dissimilarity among firm boards. This
method shows the degree of dissimilarity of all four structural
attributes of board of directors in a given firm board, from
those in other firm boards in the sample. We construct a matrix
by first measuring the dissimilarity between a given firm and
another firm in regard to all structural attributes of board of
directors (i.e., four attributes in this study) simultaneously.
Next, we measure such dissimilarity for all other firms. Then,
we take the average of the dissimilarity between a given firm
and the remaining firms in the sample as UW_DoB of the given
firm. Similarly, we measure UW_DoB for other firms.
Consequently, we discovered how dissimilar (or diverse) a firm
is from the remaining firms in the sample.
Because the data types of structural attributes of a board of
directors in this study are different (i.e., binary and ratio scale
types), following Han and Kamber (2006), we applied a new
approach to process all different data types together. The
technique combines the different attributes into a single
dissimilarity matrix, bringing all attributes of interest onto a
common scale of the interval [0, 1]. A higher scale represents
higher diversity-of-boards. The details of this method are in the
Appendix.
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Unweighted diversity-in-boards indices. Table 1 describes the
measurement of four demographic attributes of board of
directors in detail. Because the intent here is to measure how
diverse demographic attributes are within a board (gender, age,
education degree and nationality), each of these attributes is
measured using the modified Blau’s index (1977). This index
has been suggested as an optimal measure of diversity to
capture variations within a group of people (Harrison and Klein
2007).
Director age is classified into six subgroupings: under 36
years, 36–45, 46–55, 56–65, 66–75 and over 76, following
Mahadeo, Soobaroyen and Hanuman (2012). We choose this
classification because Mahadeo et al.’s (2012) study also
examines an emerging economy (Mauritius). Because there is
no directors over 76 in our sample firms, this subgrouping is
dropped from the classification of director age.
After identifying classifications within each of these
demographic attributes, we employed Blau’s index to measure
how diverse were the four attributes within a board above.
Blau’s index was calculated by the following formula:

1  (pk2 )

(3)

Where variety can take k = 1, …, K possible categories, and p
represents the proportion of members of board of directors in
the kth category. When Blau’s index gains a large value,
diversity-in-boards increases. However, in order to get a
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standardised range from zero to unity for all demographic
diversity attributes, we use the method introduced by Agresti
and Agresti (1978). This method multiplies Blau’s index by
K/(K-1), called the modified Blau’s index. Then, to construct
the UW_DiB, we split the sample into terciles for each attribute
to rank diversity levels (Ben-Amar et al. 2013; Hafsi and
Turgut 2013). These groups then take values of zero for the
first tercile, one for the second and two for the third. Finally,
UW_DiB is the sum of all ranked attributes that are involved in
demographic diversity within a board for each firm. A higher
value represents higher diversity-in-boards.
Weighted diversity-of-boards and weighted diversity-in-boards
indices. We construct W_DoB and W_DiB similar to
UW_DoB and UW_DiB, but each attribute of board of
directors is weighted based on executives’ perceptions to weigh
their importance (Dess and Davis 1984). Specifically, we
conduct a survey to examine executives’ perceptions of the
relevance of board of directors’ attributes on earnings quality of
Vietnamese listed firms.4 Corporate executives of Vietnamese
listed firms experientially know the mindset of the board of
directors towards the quality of earnings; hence we request that
executives assign weighting to each attribute of board of
directors which impacts on earnings quality of Vietnamese
listed firms. Each attribute is assigned a weight ranging from 0
(unimportant) to 10 (most important). This wide scale increase
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the variance obtained and to make the results more reliable
(Hartley and Betts 2010). The questionnaire was sent to 150
executives of all the firms in the sample. A total of 80 usable
replies were received which represented a response rate of
53.33%.
In order to measure W_DoB, we calculate  ij( f ) in Equation
(7) (see the Appendix) with each attribute to construct the
diversity-of-boards index of each firm by the following
formula:

 ij( f ) 

p * MEANRATING f



p

MEANRATING f
f 1

(4)

(f)
where  ij is the indicator of attributes f weighted; p is the

number of attributes f; and MEANRATING is the mean
importance rating of each attribute f. Then we use equation (7)
(f)
with  ij modified to measure W_DoB of each firm board.

Turning to W_DiB, based on the mean importance rating of
each attribute from the questionnaire survey, we calculated
W_DiB as the sum of all the ranked attributes (out of four) used
to construct the diversity-in-boards index in this study, with
each ranked attribute being a multiple of its mean importance
rating. A higher value represents higher diversity-in-boards.
Control variables. We control for several variables that are
described as ‘innate determinants’ in prior research where they
are found to be related to earnings quality (Francis et al. 2005).
These control variables are referred to as innate determinants
21

because they are less likely to change in the short run. They
include firm size (SIZE), length of operating cycle (LOG.OC),
cash

flow

variability

(STD.CFO),

sales

variability

(STD.SALES), and incidence of net loss realizations (LOSS).
All variables are measured over rolling five-year periods,
consistent with the measures of earnings quality. SIZE is
computed as log of the firm’s average total assets. LOG.OC is
measured as the log of the sum of the firm’s days account
receivable and days inventory. STD.CFO is calculated as the
standard deviation of the firm’s cash flows from operations,
scaled by total assets. STD.SALES is measured as the standard
deviation of the firm’s sales revenues, scaled by total assets.
LOSS is computed as the number of years where the firm
reported loss over previous five years. Because the government
still holds a large proportion of ownership in many Vietnamese
listed firms (Vu et al. 2011) and studies using the sample in
China (Ding et al. 2007; Wang and Yung 2011) show that state
ownership is related to earnings quality, we also use the state
ownership

(STATE),

measured

by

the

percentage

of

shareholding owned by the state, as a control variable in this
study.
The impact of board diversity on earnings quality
We tested hypotheses 1 and 2 regarding the effects of board
diversity on earnings quality, using an ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimator. The regression functions are:
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EQi  0  1DoBi   j ,i control var iablesi   i

(5)

EQi  0  1DiBi   j ,i control var iablesi   i

(6)

where EQi = firm i’s the stadardised aggregate earnings quality
score, calculated as the average rank across the four individual
measures (AQ, PERSIS, PREDICT, SMOOTH); DoBi = firm
i’s indices (unweighted and weighted) of diversity-of-boards;
DiBi = firm i’s indies (unweighted and weighted) of diversityin-boards.

Findings
Descriptive statistics
Table 2 shows a statistical description of the mean score of 80
executives’ perception about attributes. The scores vary
between 4.3 and 8.5 within a possible score range between zero
and 10. Respondents considered the Promoters attribute (i.e.,
the percentage of executive directors who also serve as
representative directors on the board) as the most important
board of directors attribute towards maintaining firms earnings
quality. Its mean score was 8.5. Respondents considered other
structural attributes of board of directors were also important.
Their responses show that structural attributes are more
important than the demographic attributes of board of directors
in the relationship with earnings quality. Among the
demographic attributes, respondents rated the directors’ gender
as the least important, with a mean of 4.3.
< Insert Table 2 about here>
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Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics. The sample mean
value of EQ is 75.5. A higher EQ implies a higher level of
earnings quality. The AQ measure has a mean value of 0.06. As
a benchmark, Boonlert-U-Thai et al. (2006) report mean values
of 0.065 in Singapore (1302 firm-year observations), 0.061 in
Thailand (1357 firm-year observations) over 1996-2002.
PERSIS, which captures (the negative of) the extent to which
an earnings innovation remains in the series, has a mean value
of -0.44. This value is roughly similar to values reported by
Francis et al. (2004) for an average of 1,471 firms per year over
1975-2001 in the U.S. that reported a mean value of -0.482.
PREDICT has a mean value of 0.07.

As

a benchmark,

Boonlert-U-Thai et al. (2006) reported mean values of 0.074 in
Singapore (1302 firm-year observations), and 0.074 in Thailand
(1357 firm-year observations) over 1996-2002. Finally,
SMOOTH, which captures the variability of income relative to
the variability of cash flows, had a mean value of 0.49. In
comparison, Hunt et al. (2000) reported a mean ratio of income
volatility to cash volatility of 0.51 (11,976 firm-year
observations) over the 1986-1994 sample.
< Insert Table 3 about here>
As shown in Table 3, UW_DoB has a range between 0.23
and 0.49, and W_DoB has a range of 0.23 and 0.51. The mean
value is 0.31 for both variables. This range indicates that the
structure of board of directors among firms in the sample is
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with and without assigning weights to the attributes
constituting diversity-of-boards. The range for UW_DiB is
between zero and 7, and its mean value is 2.91. The range for
W_DiB is between zero and 41.2 and its mean value is 16.11.
The means values of UW_DiB and W_DiB indicate that
diversity-in-boards in the sample is quite low. Despite
substantial efforts to privatize, the average state ownership
(STATE) in the Vietnamese sample is 27.61 per cent, with the
highest state ownership is 79.07 per cent.
Table 4 reports the pairwise correlation for all variables
examined in this study. Four individual earnings quality
measures (AQ, PERSIS, PREDICT, and SMOOTH) are highly
correlated with the coefficients more than 0.3, suggesting
reasonable factorability (Hair 1998). Additionally, the KaiserMeyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is 0.76 for the
overall test and more than 0.7 for each earnings attribute
measure (not tabulated), above the commonly recommended
value of greater than 0.5 (Hair 1998). The Bartlett’s test of
sphericity is significant (χ2 (6) = 257.77, p < 0.000) (not
tabulated). Adopting the ‘eigenvalue-greater-than one rule’
(Hair 1998), this study reduces the number of factors to one
because there is only one factor with eigenvalue of 2.62 (not
tabulated). Factor analysis suggests that a single factor
represents these four earnings attribute measures, and they
accounted for 65.53 per cent of the total variance, above the
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criterion of 60 per cent (Hair 1998). Hence, it is proper to
combine the four earnings attributes measures into a single
standardised aggregate measure of earnings quality. This
approach is similar to Leuz et al. (2003) who used factor
analysis to clarify the combination of four individual earnings
management measures into a standardised aggregate earnings
management score.
< Insert Table 4 about here>
Interestingly, as shown in Table 4, UW_DoB and W_DoB
are significantly and positively correlated (r = 0.987).
Similarly, UW_DiB is significantly and positively correlated
with W_DiB (r = 0.986). These results suggest that weighted
board diversity indices built based on executives’ perceptions is
similar to unweighted board diversity indices. Table 4 also
shows that the two measures of UW_DoB and W_DoB are
positively correlated with EQ as expected, while both UW_DiB
and W_DiB show no significant correlations.
Regression analyses
We checked the variance inflation factor (VIF) for our
regression models. The maximum VIF is 1.37, which is less
than

10

for

all

the

regression

models.

Thus,

the

multicollinearity does not seem to be a problem for our test
models (Gujarati and Porter 2009). To avoid the problem of
heteroskedasticity, OLS regression with heteroskedasticity
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robust standard errors (White 1980) was used to test the
relationships implicit in equations (5) and (6).
Table 5 reports the results of the regression analyses using
an aggregate earnings quality score (i.e., EQ) as the dependent
variable;

and

UW_DoB,

W_DoB,

UW_DiB,

W_DiB

alternately as the independent variables. As shown in the table,
the coefﬁcient estimate of both UW_DoB and W_DoB are
positive and signiﬁcant (p-values of 0.055 and 0.040
respectively). Because higher aggregate earnings quality scores
imply higher earnings quality, this result suggests that
diversity-of-boards improves earnings quality, confirming
Hypothesis 1 (i.e. diversity-of-boards improves earnings
quality). Meanwhile, both UW_DiB and W_DiB (p-values of
0.256 and 0.274 respectively) are not significantly related to
EQ, which rejects Hypothesis 2 (i.e. diversity-in-boards
improves earnings quality).
< Insert Table 5 about here>
The results for control variables shown in Table 5 indicate a
significant negative association between EQ and LOSS, which
suggests that firms with more negative income during five
years are associated with lower earnings quality, consistent
with prior studies (Srinidhi et al. 2011; Wang and Yung 2011).
STD.SALES and LOG.OC show positive and significant
coefficients.

SIZE

and

STD.CFO

are

not

significant.

Interestingly, the coefficients of STATEOWN are significantly
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positive with EQ, indicating that state ownership plays a
significant role in inducing better earnings quality. This finding
is consistent with the ﬁndings of Wang and Yung (2011), who
investigated the impact of state ownership on earnings
management of Chinese listed firms.
There are several possible reasons for the finding of no
relationships between diversity-in-boards and earnings quality.
First, as shown in previous studies (Hili and Affes 2012; Ye et
al. 2010), the demographic diversity attribute (gender diversity)
does not have an effect on earnings quality. Additionally, based
on the resource dependence theory, demographic differences
between board members within a board (diversity-in-boards)
are seen as a key resource that influences the strategy-making
process (Ben-Amar et al. 2013; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). In
so doing, diversity-in-boards may only indirectly influence
earnings quality. In contrast, diversity-of-boards is connected to
structural factors, representing recommended governance ‘best
practices’. Diversity-of-boards helps to ensure that managers
duly represent the strategic processes agreed by the board of
directors, and protect all shareholders’ interests (Fama 1980;
Fama and Jensen 1983). Therefore, diversity-of-boards
improves earnings quality.
Additional analysis and robustness tests
Nonlinearity and board diversity
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Ben-Amar et al. (2013) document a U-shaped relationship
between the demographic diversity of board of directors,
measured by a demographic diversity index, and merger and
acquisition performance. Therefore, we added the square of
UW_DoB, W_DoB, UW_DiB and W_DiB to the models in
Table 5 to test whether there was a U-shaped relationship
between

board

diversity

(both

diversity-of-boards

and

diversity-in-boards) and earnings quality.
The results reported in Table 6 indicate that diversity-ofboards indices (both unweighted and weighted) and their
squared values are not statistically related to the aggregate
earnings quality score. This suggests that a linear specification
is adequate in capturing the relationship between diversity-ofboards and earnings quality, as far as our sample is concerned.
Meanwhile, the diversity-in-boards indices (both unweighted
and weighted) and their squared values are statistically
significant (p-values of 0.017 and 0.040 for UW_DiB and
UW_DiB2 respectively, and 0.023 and 0.043 for W_DiB and
W_DiB2 respectively). The coefficients of diversity-in-boards
indices (both unweighted and weighted) are negative and
statistically significant; whereas the coefficients of their
squared values are positive and significant, which is consistent
with a U-shaped curve. These results are consistent those of
Ben-Amar et al. (2013), who examined the relationship
between the board of directors’ diversity configurations and
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merger

and

acquisition

performance

and

found

that

demographic diversity had a clear and non-linear effect with a
U-shaped curve on merger and acquisition performance, but
that statutory diversity had no statistically significant influence.
< Insert Table 6 about here>
Given the estimated values for the UW_DiB and UW_DiB2
coefficients, the turning point of the relationship between
diversity-in-boards (unweighted index) and earnings quality is:5
Minimization point = ˗ coefficient of UW_DiB/2*coefficient of
UW_DiB2 = ˗ (˗8.97)/2 × 1.18 ≈ 4.
These results suggest that as diversity-in-boards on the
board of directors increases, the sample firms engage in a
negative effect on earnings quality. This is probably because
the benefits of demographic diversity are counterbalanced by
problems related to integration difficulties (Ben-Amar et al.
2013). However, when UW_DiB is beyond 4, diversity-inboards improves the quality of earnings.
Measuring the aggregate earnings quality score excluding the
accruals quality measure
Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) accruals model is used as a
measure of earnings attribute in the present study, but
according to Wysocki (2006), Dechow and Dichev model does
not comprehensively capture a firm’s earnings quality. More
specifically, Wysocki find that current cash flows are
simultaneously significantly and negatively related to current
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accruals. Gaio and Raposo (2011) that use Dechow and Dichev
accruals model also mention this issue as a limitation of their
aggregate earnings quality measure. To test the validity of the
results (whether the accruals quality measure using Dechow
and Dichev’s (2002) model significantly impacts on the
standardised aggregate earnings quality score in the present
study, this study measured the standardised aggregate earnings
quality score by excluding the accruals quality measure. The
standardised aggregate earnings quality score is computed by
averaging the firm rankings for the three individual earnings
quality measures (i.e., PERSIS, PREDICT, SMOOTH). The
results (not tabulated) are similar to those in Tables 5 and 6.
The impact of board diversity on individual earnings
attributes
To check the robustness of the positive relationship between
diversity-of-boards and earnings quality, and the non-linear
relationship between diversity-in-boards and earnings quality,
similar regression models as in Tables 5 and 6, are run with
replacing the standardised aggregate earnings quality score by
four individual earnings attribute variables (AQ, PERSIS,
PREDICT, and SMOOTH) respectively. Given almost identical
results are obtained by using either unweighted or weighted
index, and for brevity, this study report results using weighted
indices of board diversity only.
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Panel A of Table 7 reports the results of the regression
analyses using each earnings quality measure (i.e., AQ,
PERSIS, PREDICT, SMOOTH) as the dependent variable and
W_DoB as the independent variable. Results show that
W_DoB is significantly related to all four earnings attribute
measures. The coefficient estimates of W_DoB are negative
and signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level or better in these regressions
where AQ, PERSIS, PREDICT, and SMOOTH alternately are
the dependent variables. The results in Panel A of Table 7
indicate that diversity-of-boards improves earnings quality
(considered individually). It is similar to the main findings from
the impact of diversity-of-boards on the standardised aggregate
earnings quality score.
< Insert Table 7 about here>
As reported in Panel B of Table 7, the coefficients of W_DiB
were still not significant. These results, therefore confirm the
initial evidence that diversity-in-boards is not related to
earnings quality. Interestingly, Panel C of Table 7 shows that
there is a non-linear relationship between diversity-in-boards
and AQ as well as between diversity-in-boards and PREDICT.
The coefficients of W_DiB are positive and statistically
significant; whereas the coefficients of their quadratic terms are
negative and significant. The larger the value of AQ and
PREDICT, the lower the earnings quality. Therefore, the results
are consistent with a U-shaped curve between diversity-in-
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boards and earnings quality, similar to the earlier finding when
examining the standardised aggregate earnings quality score as
a dependent variable. However, W_DiB and its quadratic terms
are not significant to PERSIS and SMOOTH.
Alternative regression specifications
This paper measures diversity-in-boards indices through the
terciles split method which split the sample into terciles for
each demographic attribute of board of directors to rank
diversity levels (Ben-Amar et al. 2013; Hafsi and Turgut 2013).
For a robustness check, this thesis measured diversity-in-boards
indices using median and quartile values alternately to rank
firms’ diversity levels. Specifically, the median split method
categorized each demographic attribute into two groups, taking
one if every value above the median, otherwise zero. The
quartile split method categorized each demographic attribute
into four groups, taking zero for the first quartile, one for the
second quartile, two for the third quartile, and three for the
fourth quartile. The results are similar to the main findings.
Summary and concluding remarks
This paper develops diversity-of-boards and diversity-in-boards
indices (including both unweighted and weighted) and explores
the relationship between board diversity and earnings quality
measured by a standardised aggregate score compiled from four
accounting-based measures of earnings quality of Vietnamese
listed firms. We hypothesise that diversity-of-boards and
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diversity-in-boards are positively associated with earnings
quality (Hypotheses 1 and 2 respectively). The results are
consistent with expectations for Hypothesis 1, but not for
Hypothesis 2. Specifically, our findings suggest that diversityof-boards (using both weighted and unweighted indices)
improves earnings quality. The diversity-in-boards (using both
weighted and unweighted indices) is not linearly related to
earnings quality, and results suggest a nonlinear relationship
with a U-shaped curve between diversity-in-boards and
earnings quality.
We construct weighted diversity-of-boards and weighted
diversity-in-boards indices to examine their influences to avoid
treating attributes with equal importance when lumping
attributes in diversity-of-boards and diversity-in-boards indices.
There is no significant difference in the relation between board
diversity and earnings quality using weighted and unweighted
approaches to construct board diversity indices. We also
conduct several other robustness checks to explore the
robustness of our results, but our main findings and inferences
are not affected.
However, we acknowledge that the sample size may limit
the generalizability of our results. This is because there must be
7 years’ data available to measure accruals quality, while two
Vietnamese stock exchanges, HOSE and HNX, were
established in the years 2000 and 2005, respectively. Future
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studies could explore a large-scale longitudinal analysis of our
study.
In spite of the limitations, this study makes contributions.
First, this is the first concerted attempt to examine the impact of
board diversity on the quality of earnings for a small and newly
emerging market, Vietnam. Vietnam is one of the lowest
ranked countries for protecting investors among the Southeast
Asian countries (World Bank, 2013). The findings of this study
assist Vietnamese policymakers in reviewing the implications
of the current corporate governance codes about boards of
directors in the context of Vietnam to increase firms’ reporting
transparency and accountability to investors. It may also assist
other emerging nations with a low level of investor protection
but striving to improve corporate governance. Second, most
previous studies on board diversity have focused on either
demographic or structural attributes of boards of directors
separately. The board diversity measure in this study uses a
wide range of demographic and structural attributes to construct
two different dimensions of board diversity, including
diversity-of-boards and diversity-in-boards. This approach
takes a broader view of board diversity impacts on earnings
quality. Third, the design and development of board diversity
indices (both weighted and unweighted) may help to advance
ways of measuring board diversity.
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Appendix. Method of measuring unweighted diversity-ofboards index (UW_DoB)
First, we measured the dissimilarity between a given firm and
another firm, and we then measured such dissimilarity for all
other firms, using a mathematical distance function defined by
Han and Kamber (2006) as follows:

  d
d(i , j) 
 
p

f 1
p

(f) (f)
ij
ij

f 1

(7)

(f)
ij

where d(i, j) is a distance function (metric) used to express the
(dis)similarity between two objects (firms) i and j; i and j are
two p-dimensional data points represented as (xi1, xi2, …, xip)
and (xj1, xj2, …, xjp) respectively; the indicator  ij( f ) = 1 with the
assumption that attributes f are equal weights to the relative
contributions of each attribute f to the distance function.
Then, the contribution of attribute f to the dissimilarity
between i and j (i.e., dij( f ) ) is computed based on the data type of
the attribute:
a)

If f is binary or categorical: dij( f ) = 0 if xif = xjf, or

otherwise dij( f ) = 1;
b)

If f is interval scale: dij( f ) 

xif  x jf
max h xhf  minh xhf

where h runs over all non-missing objects for attribute f;
c)

If f is ordinal: compute ranks rif and zif 

and treat zif as interval-scaled (rif ∈ [1,…,Mf]);
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rif  1
Mf  1

,

d)

If f is ratio scale: either perform logarithmic

transformation and treat the transformed data as interval
scale; or treat f as continuous ordinal data, compute rif and
zif, and then treat zif as interval scale; or treat ratio scale
attributes like interval scale attributes.
In this function, the contribution of dissimilarity all
different attributes (i.e., dij( f ) ) are normalized, and hence
expressed on a common scale of [0, 1]. Then, we take the
average distance (dissimilarity) to all the other boards (we
deduct 1 because we compare a firm with other firms without
the firm being compared):


D(i) 

n
j 1

d(i , j)

(8)

n 1

where n is the number of firm boards; D(i) is the average
distance (dissimilarity) of firm board i to all other boards in the
sample, namely UW_DoB of each firm board.
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Table 1 Description of the variables included in diversity indices)
Variables

Measurement
Included variables in diversity-of-boards indices
CEO/chair separation
0 if the chairperson also serves as the CEO
and 1 otherwise.
Non-executive directors
1 if there is more than one non-executive
owning more than 5% of a director who also serves as a blockholder and
firm’s equity
0 otherwise.
(blockholders)
Representative directors’
The percentage of state ownership represented
ownership
by directors.
Promoters
The number of inside directors also serves as
representative directors for government
divided by total number of directors on the
board of directors.
Included variables in diversity-in-boards indices
Director gender
Using modified Blau’s index with a
classification of male and female directors
Director age
Using modified Blau’s index with a
classification of five subgroupings: under 36
years, 36–45, 46–55, 56–65, and over 65
Director education degree
Using modified Blau’s index with a
classification of four subgroupings: PhD,
master’s, bachelor’s and others
Director nationality
Using modified Blau’s index with a
classification of foreign and domestic
directors
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics for importance rating based on
industry executives’ responses
Importance rating
Max Min Mean SD
Structural attributes
CEO/chair serperation
10
3
8.2
1.22
% Representative directors’ ownership
10
6
7.8
1.08
% Promoters
10
6
8.5
1.19
Non-executive directors owning > 5% of a
firm’s equity
9
3
7.1
1.73
Demographic attributes
Gender diversity in board of directors
7
0
4.3
2.35
Age diversity in board of directors
8
0
5.6
2.32
Education degree diversity in board of directors 8
3
6
1.36
Nationality diversity in board of directors
9
5
7.5
1.06
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics
Variables
Max Min Mean SD
Dependent variables
EQ
126.50 1.00
75.50 27.65
Four earnings attributes to construct the aggregate earnings quality score
AQ
0.4
0.001
0.06
0.06
PERSIS
4.78
-2.8
-0.44 0.86
PREDICT
0.4
0.01
0.07
0.08
SMOOTH
2.65
0.03
0.49
0.45
Independent variables
UW_DoB
0.49
0.23
0.31
0.07
W_DoB
0.51
0.23
0.31
0.07
UW_DiB
7.00
0.00
2.91
1.69
W_DiB
41.20 0.00
16.11 9.71
Structural attributes of board of directors to construct DoB_Index
CEO/chair seperation
1
0
0.61
0.49
% Representative directors’ ownership
0.79
0
0.22
0.23
% Promoters
0.86
0
0.13
0.2
Non-executive directors owning > 5% of a
firm’s equity
1
0
0.14
0.35
Demographic attributes of board of directors measured by the modified
Blau’s index to construct DiB_Index
Gender diversity in board of directors
0.98
0.00
0.39
0.38
Age diversity in board of directors
0.92
0.00
0.64
0.20
Education degree diversity in board of
directors
0.93
0.00
0.38
0.27
Nationality diversity in board of directors 1.00
0.00
0.08
0.23
Control variables
SIZE
7.24
4.36
5.69
0.62
STD.CFO
0.77
0.02
0.16
0.11
STD.SALES
2.33
0.02
0.38
0.42
LOG.OC
3.37
1.07
2.15
0.38
LOSS
3
0
0.25
0.6
STATE
1.00
0.00
0.51
0.50
This table shows summary statistics for variables used in this paper. The
final sample consists of 150 ﬁrms listed on HOSE and HNX, each with a
continuous listing history over the entire period from 2005 to 2011 for the
2010 sample. EQ is the firm-specific standardised aggregate earnings
quality score; AQ, PERSIS, PREDICT and SMOOTH are firm-specific
accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability and earnings
smoothness values, respectively; UW_DoB and W_DoB are unweighted
and weighted diversity-of-boards indices respectively; UW_DiB and
W_DiB are unweighted and weighted diversity-in-boards indices
respectively; SIZE is firm size; STD.CFO is cash ﬂow variability;
STD.SALES is sales variability; LOG.OC is length of operating cycle;
LOSS is the firm’s incidence of net loss realizations; STATE is state
ownership.
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Table 4 Correlation matrix
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1 AQ

1.000

2 PERSIS

0.394

1.000

3 PREDICT

0.666

0.390

1.000

4 SMOOTH

0.618

0.317

0.771

5 EQ

-0.520 -0.422 -0.585 -0.566 1.000

6 UW_DoB

-0.120 -0.160 -0.144 -0.191 0.151

1.000

7 W_DoB

-0.123 -0.176 -0.156 -0.194 0.167

0.987

8 UW_DiB

0.120 -0.013 0.044 -0.010 -0.134 -0.058 -0.100 1.000

9 W_DiB

0.113 -0.018 0.036 -0.014 -0.132 -0.069 -0.110 0.986

1.000

10 SIZE

0.028 -0.075 0.044 -0.028 -0.002 0.160

0.193

11 STD.CFO

0.112

0.060

11

12

13

14

15

1.000

1.000

0.194

0.147

1.000

0.169 -0.200 0.003 -0.038 -0.032 -0.019 -0.026 -0.064 1.000

12 STD.SALES

0.009 -0.060 -0.033 -0.141 0.026 -0.136 -0.128 0.026

0.024 -0.025 0.278

13 OPCYCLE

-0.187 -0.140 -0.102 -0.063 0.224

0.011 -0.012 0.118

0.115

0.108 -0.164 -0.439 1.000

14 LOSS

-0.020 0.034

0.039 -0.200 -0.113 -0.117 0.115

0.103

0.017

15 STATE

-0.148 0.001 -0.221 -0.161 0.164

0.130

0.027

1.000

0.022 -0.040 -0.033 1.000

0.109 -0.390 -0.403 -0.087 0.039 -0.040 -0.125 -0.130 1.000

*Bold text indicates significance at the 10% level or better.
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Table 5 Board diversity (unweighted and weighted indices) and
earnings quality
Dependent Variable
UW_DoB
W_DoB

EQ
59.67*
(0.055)

EQ

EQ

EQ

67.77**
(0.040)

UW_DiB

-1.63
(0.256)

W_DiB

-0.28
(0.274)
SIZE
-1.76
-2.174
-0.08
0.10
(0.603)
(0.521)
(0.981)
(0.978)
STD.CFO
0.82
0.72
1.18
1.11
(0.966)
(0.970)
(0.951)
(0.954)
STD.SALES
12.77**
12.831**
11.27**
11.20**
(0.019)
(0.018)
(0.033)
(0.034)
LOG.OC
24.20***
24.45***
23.84***
23.72***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
LOSS
-6.37*
-6.351*
-6.95*
-7.03**
(0.083)
(0.082)
(0.051)
(0.048)
STATE
23.48**
21.67**
19.15*
19.12*
(0.015)
(0.024)
(0.081)
(0.086)
Constant
5.22
4.963
21.54
20.52
(0.839)
(0.846)
(0.383)
(0.407)
Adjusted R2
0.120
0.123
0.104
0.103
F statistic
4.02***
4.10***
4.11***
4.08***
p-value
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.000
Mean VIF
1.14
1.15
1.18
1.18
The p-values are in parentheses, calculated using standard errors corrected
for heteroskedasticity. Statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and *
for 1%, 5%, and 10%.
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Table 6 Nonlinear relationship between board diversity and
earnings quality
UW_DoB
UW_DoB2
W_DoB
W_DoB2

EQ
172.65
(0.558)
˗164.72
(0.699)

EQ

EQ

EQ

1.26
(0.997)
98.36
(0.818)
˗8.97**
(0.017)
1.18**
(0.040)

UW_DiB
UW_DiB2

˗1.44**
(0.023)
W_DiB2
0.03**
(0.043)
SIZE
˗1.75
˗2.29
˗0.18
˗0.06
(0.606)
(0.505)
(0.960)
(0.987)
STD.CFO
0.91
0.64
4.71
4.46
(0.962)
(0.973)
(0.807)
(0.817)
STD.SALES
12.64**
12.90**
11.39**
11.05**
(0.020)
(0.017)
(0.033)
(0.038)
LOG.OC
24.23***
24.50***
23.55***
23.55***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
LOSS
˗6.42*
˗6.34*
˗6.82*
˗6.78*
(0.084)
(0.081)
(0.059)
(0.061)
STATE
22.73**
21.67**
19.06*
19.33*
(0.018)
(0.024)
(0.080)
(0.080)
Constant
˗12.96
16.19
30.13
28.22
(0.819)
(0.782)
(0.224)
(0.258)
Adjusted R2
0.115
0.117
0.119
0.115
F statistic
3.50***
3.80***
4.18***
4.06***
p-value
0.001
0.001
0.000
0.000
The p-values are in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by ***,
**, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%.
W_DiB
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Table 7 Board diversity and individual earnings attribute measures
Panel A: Diversity-of-boards and individual EQ measures

W_DoB

AQ

PERSIS

PREDICT

SMOOTH

-0.133*

-2.463**

-0.173**

-1.473***

(0.077)

(0.020)

(0.032)

(0.001)

W_DiB

Panel B: Diversity-in-boards and individual EQ measures

AQ

PERSIS

PREDICT

SMOOTH

AQ

PERSIS

PREDICT

SMOOTH

0.001

0.001

-0.001

-0.003

0.0034**

-0.0160

0.0034*

0.0102

(0.230)

(0.933)

(0.367)

(0.416)

W_DiB2
SIZE
STD.CFO
STD.SALES
LOG.OC
LOSS
STATE

Panel C: Nonlinearity and diversity-in-boards

(0.023)

(0.505)

(0.093)

(0.481)

-0.0001*

0.0005

-0.0001**

-0.0004

(0.093)

(0.462)

(0.039)

(0.263)

0.010

-0.020

0.014

0.006

0.004

-0.080

0.010

-0.021

0.0047

-0.0822

0.0106

-0.0194

(0.186)

(0.864)

(0.215)

(0.927)

(0.609)

(0.467)

(0.372)

(0.729)

(0.579)

(0.486)

(0.340)

(0.751)

0.059

0.559

0.137**

-1.083***

0.092

0.541

0.183*

-1.096***

0.0841

0.5891

0.1709*

-1.1348***

(0.155)

(0.379)

(0.046)

(0.000)

(0.203)

(0.327)

(0.068)

(0.001)

(0.228)

(0.366)

(0.078)

(0.000)

-0.022

-0.423**

-0.030**

-0.217**

-0.032

-0.353

-0.042

-0.171**

-0.0314

-0.3550*

-0.0419

-0.1695**

(0.110)

(0.032)

(0.049)

(0.012)

(0.182)

(0.116)

(0.144)

(0.040)

(0.183)

(0.073)

(0.145)

(0.043)

-0.048***

-0.504**

-0.033*

-0.231**

-0.061**

-0.460*

-0.048

-0.197*

-0.0611**

-0.4623**

-0.0476

-0.1951**

(0.003)

(0.017)

(0.078)

(0.022)

(0.022)

(0.059)

(0.143)

(0.046)

(0.022)

(0.032)

(0.144)

(0.049)

-0.007

-0.013

0.017*

0.009

-0.010

0.021

0.015

0.032

-0.0103

0.0243

0.0137

0.0295

(0.375)

(0.914)

(0.058)

(0.856)

(0.313)

(0.821)

(0.215)

(0.483)

(0.295)

(0.839)

(0.254)

(0.528)

-0.050**

-0.071

-0.079***

-0.305*

-0.064

-0.132

-0.128**

-0.404**

-0.0649

-0.1293

-0.1286**

-0.4061**

(0.041)

(0.827)

(0.009)

(0.052)

(0.191)

(0.746)

(0.040)

(0.034)

(0.189)

(0.717)

(0.039)

(0.033)
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Constant
Adjusted R

2

0.160**

1.616*

0.120

1.742***

0.176*

1.072

0.150

1.425***

0.1583*

1.1816

0.1232

1.3345***

(0.031)

(0.055)

(0.104)

(0.000)

(0.075)

(0.240)

(0.213)

(0.001)

(0.086)

(0.159)

(0.281)

(0.004)

0.055

0.038

0.127

0.153

0.055

0.000

0.083

0.108

0.058

-0.003

0.093

0.111

F statistic

2.37**

1.84*

4.56***

6.50***

2.37**

1.01

3.47***

4.92***

2.08**

0.95

2.90***

4.46***

p-value

0.025

0.084

0.000

0.000

0.025

0.430

0.002

0.000

0.041

0.481

0.005

0.000

The p-values are in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%.

1

In the Vietnamese listed firms, the concept of outside and inside directors has not been clarified and practiced yet. Presently, just only non-executive directors are defined as
outside/independent directors and executive directors are considered inside directors.
2
Gaio and Raposo (2011) used a 6-year rolling windows instead of a 14-year rolling windows to compute earnings quality measures and reported similar results.
3
For validity purposes, this study also used four individual earnings attribute measures (accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability and earnings
smoothness) instead of the standardised aggregate earnings quality score in the robustness tests.
4
The survey was carried out in accordance with Ethical Requirements for Research with Low Risk, and this study has been approved by the Human Research Ethics
Committee.
5
Because almost identical results are obtained by using either unweighted or weighted index, for brevity, this paper only presents results using unweighted index of diversityin-boards. Other results are available upon request.
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